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THE ASYLUM MAKEOVER: CHEVRON DEFERENCE, THE 
SELF-REFERRAL AND REVIEW AUTHORITY 
Jessica Senat* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, judicial deference under administrative law was a 
much-needed solution; it filled a void by providing specialized areas 
where the court lacked expertise.  Administrative agencies in the 
Executive Branch carry legal expertise in a specialized area, and courts 
will defer to the agency’s interpretation of law as long as it does not 
generally impede on constitutional rights and does not result in 
arbitrary application of law.1  Judicial deference is known to be 
applicable in many areas of law, such as environmental and industrial 
law.2  The landmark case, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council,3 produced the Chevron test which requires courts to 
defer to an agency’s interpretation of law, absent congressional 
interpretation on the statute in question.4  Courts termed it “Chevron 
deference” when they defer to agency interpretation of law where 
congressional interpretation is lacking.  
Under immigration law, courts have applied the Chevron test 
to determine the interpretation of the Particular Social Group (“PSG”) 
requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); the federal statute 
grants asylum to persecuted refugees.5  The statute states, in relevant 
part, that an “applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, 
 
* Jessica Senat, Law Student at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, class of 2020.  
Received a Bachelor of Arts in English Literature from Fordham University at Lincoln Center. 
1 J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with A Wink and A Nod to 
Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 26 (2010); The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 38 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989). 
2 Goering, supra note 1, at 38. 
3 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
4 Id. at 842-43. 
5 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018). 
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membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or 
will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant” when 
seeking asylum protection.6  The Board of Immigration Appeal 
(“BIA”)7 held that in order to satisfy the PSG standard, the group must 
be based on (1) an immutable (shared) characteristic, (2) be socially 
visible; and (3) particularly defined.8  Circuit courts disagree on 
whether the BIA’s interpretation of the PSG merits Chevron 
deference.9  But a broader issue is whether Chevron deference should 
be used in immigration law at all.  Although Chevron deference was 
implemented to solve interpretation issues, it poses the risk of 
uprooting basic constitutional rights of refugee applicants in today’s 
immigration reform efforts. 
One major issue that results from the use of Chevron deference 
in immigration law is the threat of political and judicial biases to 
immigration reform.  It is well known that all politicians hold personal 
biases.  But these biases deserve more scrutiny when they threaten 
basic constitutional freedoms.  Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
amplified this threat in the Matter of A-B-.10  By using a rare referral 
 
6 Id. (“To establish that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of such section, the 
applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the 
applicant.”). 
7 The BIA is the highest administrative court in the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review or “EOIR.”  The EOIR is an administrative agency under the Executive branch.  It is 
authorized to adjudicate immigration cases under the authority of the Attorney General.  The 
BIA has 21 Board Members.  Its job is to “resolve the questions before it in a manner that is 
timely, impartial, and consistent” as well as “provide clear and uniform guidance to the 
service, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and 
administration of the Act and its implementing regulations.”  8 C.F.R. §1003.1(d)(1) (2018).  
The BIA rarely holds courtroom proceedings, but only reviews and decides appeals by “paper 
review” of cases.  Applicants may appeal to the BIA after receiving decisions from 
immigration judges and directors of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).  BIA 
decisions are binding on all DHS officers and immigration judges unless they are modified or 
overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court.  Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last updated Oct. 15, 
2018).   
8 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-83 (B.I.A. 2008). 
9 Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that being a former gang 
member is recognized as a particular social group); Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902 (4th Cir. 
2014), as revised (Jan. 27, 2014) (same); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that former/current gang membership does not constitute a particular social group for 
the purposes of the asylum statute); Gonzalez v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 820 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(same). 
10 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
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and review mechanism to refer the case to himself,11 Sessions reversed 
Matter of A-R-C-G-, a decision that allowed women fleeing domestic 
violence to apply for asylum.12  In the opinion, he dismissed domestic 
and gang violence as a claim that is “unlikely to satisfy the statutory 
grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable 
or unwilling to address.”13  Sessions did not implement new standards 
of law, but denounced the BIA’s failure to properly follow precedent 
in deciding Matter of A-R-C-G-.14  This conclusion is questionable 
because the decision itself is overshadowed by outdated views on 
gender violence, and inflated legal requirements that cause more 
confusion than clarity.15 
In addition, the Chevron test promotes growth of judicial 
biases, which threatens any chances left for refugees to seek 
protections in the United States.  In a George Washington Law Review 
article, Chevron Bias,16 Philip Hamburger puts the values of Chevron 
deference against the long-standing values of the U.S. Constitution.17  
Hamburger argued that deference to agency interpretation produces 
“systematic biases”; the doctrine violates the Fifth Amendment right 
to due process because the Chevron test requires judges, absent 
congressional interpretational basis, to defer to the government’s 
interpretation of an issue.18  This problem is even more prominent in 
cases where the government is a party.19  The BIA is the perfect stage 
for these biases to work against refugee applicants, especially in the 
case of asylum protections.  
This Note argues that judicial deference adversely impacts 
asylum applicants.  Allowing flexibility in interpretation of important 
immigration laws causes confusion and distances U.S. immigration 
law from its initial purposes.  Further, Jeff Sessions’ work as a senator, 
and later as U.S. Attorney General, amplified divisiveness, prejudice 
 
11 The provision states in relevant part “[t]he Board shall refer to the Attorney General for 
review of its decision all cases that: (i) The Attorney General directs the Board to refer to 
him.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1). 
12 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390 (B.I.A. 2014). 
13 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320. 
14 Id. at 333. 
15 Id. 
16 Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (2016) (discussing 
systematic biases). 
17 Id. at 1191-92. 
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and unfounded fear of the “other.”  The self-referral provision should 
be amended to prevent abuse of the provision by the Attorney General. 
This Note addresses the legislative history of the asylum statute 
in Part II.20  The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees was the foundation for asylum law in the United 
States.21  Part III discusses the PSG requirement and the resulting 
circuit split over its interpretation.  Part IV briefly highlights the 
history of administrative law, and discusses the political, 
constitutional, and judicial ramifications of Chevron deference in 
modern day immigration reform. 
 Part V evaluates Jeff Sessions’ work under the Trump 
Administration and how constitutional rights have been disregarded 
for personal agendas.  Part VI analyzes how the self-referral 
mechanism disrupts the immigration process and contravenes 
constitutional principles.  Finally, Part VII looks at how Congress and 
the judiciary may regain some ground.  Although deference is a 
necessary tool in ensuring that principles are applied in a fair and 
knowledgeable manner, for the sake of ensuring that constitutional 
right to due process remains intact, there should be a limit to when 
courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law.  Where there is a 
threat to foundational principles and a call to answer basic human 
needs, the courts should take a closer look instead of deferring to 
agencies’ standards.  
II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW 
The history of refugee laws in the United States errs more on 
the side of exclusivity than inclusivity.22  Discriminatory policies were 
prevalent: an example of this is the Emergency Quota Acts of 1921 
and 1924.23  Congress designed a quota system that limited the number 
of minorities entering the United States and made the process easier 
for Northern and Western Europeans.24  Remnants of this 
 
20 Kathryn M. Bockley, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The Deception of 
Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 253 (1995). 
21 Id. at 278. 
22 Id. 
23 Bockley, supra note 20, at 259. 
24 Id. (“The Quota Act set forth percentages of immigrants eligible for admission from both 
northern and southeastern Europe based on percentages derived from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
However, immigration from the western European countries remained unrestricted. . . . [T]he 
Quota Act has been widely criticized for elevating the issues of race, ethnic prejudice and 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 2, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/11
2019 ASYLUM MAKEOVER 871 
discrimination remained when Congress enacted the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) in 1955, even after the quota system was 
eliminated under the amendments to the INA laws.25 
In 1967, the United States began to take steps to eliminate 
discriminatory refugee policies.26  Today’s immigration and refugee 
laws are based on the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees or “Refugee Convention.”27  The Refugee 
Convention was a response to the refugee crisis left in the wake of 
World War II.  It defined its purpose to protect any “person who faces 
serious human rights abuses where a state has failed in its fundamental 
obligation of protection for reasons of the person’s status or beliefs, 
resulting in fundamental marginalization and an inability of the person 
to vindicate his or her rights in his or her home country.”28  Under the 
Convention, an applicant only needed to show that he or she has a 
“well-founded fear” of persecution.29 
Congress incorporated these provisions of the Refugee 
Convention when it signed the United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (“Protocol of 1967”).30  However, it was not until 
the Refugee Act of 1980 when the United States removed geographical 
or ideological biases and expanded the definition of refugee to include 
all persons regardless of ethnicity or nationality.31  Congress created 
the Refugee Act to bring the United States immigration laws in line 
with the United Nations Protocol.32 In addition, the Refugee Act 
 
assimilation above any concerns for human suffering or the desperate situation of particular 
refugees.”). 
25 Refugee Timeline: Immigration and Naturalization Service Refugee Law and Policy 
Timeline, 1891-2003, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-
genealogy/our-history/refugee-timeline (last updated Feb. 20, 2018) (discussing that the INA 
removed the quota system but still included preferences that favored immigrants from western 
Europe). 
26 Id. 
27 DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:2, Westlaw 
(database updated April 2018) (explaining that in the United States, there are three major forms 
of protections for refugees: asylum, withholding of removal, and convention against torture). 
28 Id.; see also Bockley, supra note 20, at 278. 
29 Bockley, supra note 20, at 278. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 281; Refugee Timeline, supra note 25.  
32 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 106 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The Board of Immigration 
Appeals (‘BIA’), has also recognized that Congress’ intent in enacting the Refugee Act was 
to align domestic refugee law with the United States’ obligations under the Protocol, to give 
statutory meaning to ‘our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns,’ 
and ‘to afford a generous standard for protection in cases of doubt.’” (citing In re S-P-, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1998))). 
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included the new PSG standard.33  Under this standard, an applicant is 
required to prove that he or she is fleeing persecution on the basis of 
being a member of a social group.34 Although this standard established 
the requirement for proving persecution, the Act failed to clearly 
define the phrase “persecution on the basis of being a member of a 
social group.”  As a result, the PSG requirement was left to the BIA 
for interpretation and clarification.  
III. THE PSG STANDARD35 
Many disagree on how to interpret the PSG requirement.  In 
1987, the BIA sought to provide clarification of this term in Matter of 
Acosta and stated that 
we interpret the phrase “persecution on account of 
membership in a particular social group” to mean 
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is 
a member of a group of persons all of whom share a 
common, immutable characteristic. The shared 
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, 
or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a 
shared past experience such as former military 
leadership or land ownership. The particular kind of 
group characteristic that will qualify under this 
construction remains to be determined on a case-by-
case basis.36 
The BIA relied on the doctrine of “ejusdem generis” or “of the same 
kind” in establishing the PSG definition.  It defined the PSG 
requirement in relation to the other categories listed in the statute: the 
particular social group must be a distinct persecuted group based on 
race, politics, religion, sex and nationality.37  Furthermore, the BIA 
 
33 ANKER, supra note 27. 
34 Melissa J. Hernandez Pimentel, The Invisible Refugee: Examining the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ “Social Visibility” Doctrine, 76 MO. L. REV. 575, 596 (2010). 
35 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (“To establish that the applicant is a refugee within 
the meaning of such section, the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central 
reason for persecuting the applicant.”). 
36 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (emphasis added). 
37 Id. 
6
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stated that the “shared characteristic” is found in the fact that it cannot 
be changed.38   
In 2008, the BIA established additional requirements for 
satisfying the PSG standard.39  In the Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA stated 
that in order to satisfy the PSG standard, the group must be based on 
(1) an immutable [shared] characteristic, (2) be socially visible; and 
(3) particularly defined.40  The BIA stated that “[t]he essence of the 
‘particularity’ requirement . . . is whether the proposed group can 
accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group 
would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of 
persons.”41  In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA further defined 
particularity as having “definable boundaries”; it must be defined 
specifically and not be “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse or 
subjective.”42  The “social visibility” element is satisfied if the society 
in question perceives the group as socially distinct.43  Another 
requirement for the PSG standard is nexus,44 which is established when 
the applicant shows that “his membership in a particular social group 
was or will be a central reason for his persecution.”45  The BIA stated 
that the persecutor’s views and motives are important in establishing 
nexus.46 
The BIA claimed the PSG elements “may overlap in 
application, but each serves a separate purpose.”47 Although the BIA 
acknowledges that the “social distinction” and “particularity” 
requirements overlap, the court explaines that each requirement 
“emphasize[s] a different aspect of a particular social group.”48  
 
38 Id. 
39 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
591 (B.I.A. 2008) (in both cases, respondents were fleeing gang violence.  The BIA reviewed 
the eligibility of persons who applied for asylum on the basis of being a member of a gang.). 
40 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582-83. 
41 Id. at 584. 
42 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014). 
43 Id. at 241. 
44 Id. at 242. 
45 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 223 (B.I.A. 2014). 
46 Id. (“[T]he persecutor’s views play a greater role in determining whether persecution is 
inflicted on account of the victim’s membership in a particular social group.”). 
47 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241 (“They overlap because the overall definition 
is applied in the fact-specific context of an applicant’s claim for relief.”). 
48 Id.  The BIA further explained that “[s]ocietal considerations have a significant impact 
on whether a proposed group describes a collection of people with appropriately defined 
boundaries and is sufficiently ‘particular.’  Similarly, societal considerations influence 
7
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However, the BIA’s interpretation creates a very narrow standard for 
applicants, increases the difficulty in providing proof, and confuses the 
requirements with overlapping definitional terms.  In “Rejecting the 
Children of Violence: Why U.S. Asylum Law Should Return to the 
Acosta Definition of ‘A Particular Social Group,’” Rachel Gonzalez 
Settlage noted the difficulty in proving the social distinction and the 
particularity requirements.  Settlage stated “[p]articularity . . . suggests 
hard limits and requires specificity of definition.  A group cannot be 
too broad or too diffuse.  However, if a proposed social group has been 
defined with sufficient particularity, then it would likely be too narrow 
to meet the requirement of social distinction.”49  In other words, if the 
applicant provides evidence proving that the society in question uses 
specific parameters to define the social group, rendering them “socially 
distinct,” these parameters may not satisfy the particularity 
requirement if the BIA finds that it is too “broad” or “amorphous.”50  
Although Settlage discusses this difficulty for applicants that are 
fleeing gang violence,51 the standards can frustrate applicants from 
various backgrounds. 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DEFERENCE AND THE CHEVRON TEST 
Judicial deference grew from the “respect for the specialized 
expertise” government agencies held in addressing social and 
economic policy.52   Under the immigration law, many courts today 
cite Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council as the 
primary guide in determining when judicial deference is applicable to 
an agency’s interpretation of law.53  However, the Chevron Court 
failed to explicitly acknowledge the Administrative Procedure Act of 
1946 as a foundational guideline.54 
 
whether the people of a given society would perceive a proposed group as sufficiently separate 
or distinct to meet the ‘societal distinction’ test.”  Id. 
49 Rachel Gonzalez Settlage, Rejecting the Children of Violence: Why U.S. Asylum Law 
Should Return to the Acosta Definition of “A Particular Social Group,” 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
287, 310 (2016). 
50 Id.; see also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR ASYLUM 
AFTER MATTER OF A-B- (Jan. 2019), https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-
type/page/documents/2019-01/Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%201. 
2019%20Update%20-%20Final.pdf. 
51 Settlage, supra note 49, at 328. 
52 Goering, supra note 1, at 26. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 34. 
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A. Judicial Review Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides 
guidelines for administrative adjudication, hearings, rulemaking, and 
decisions.55  Also, the APA provides standards for judicial review of 
agency action.56  Under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), in order to set aside an 
agency’s action, courts must conclude that the regulation is “arbitrary 
and capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law.”57  
The APA’s goal is to strengthen the administrative process by 
providing limitations on the scope of judicial review.58  In Tailoring 
Deference to Variety with A Wink and A Nod to Chevron: The Roberts 
Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Law, J. Lyn Entrikin Goering observes that although 
the APA authorizes a broad range of judicial scrutiny, many courts fail 
to reference the APA or even take advantage of its full authority in 
reviewing agency actions.59  However, there is no mention of the APA 
guidelines in Chevron or any reference to the APA as the initial 
foundation for the Chevron test itself.60  
B. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. 
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., the Supreme Court held that judicial deference to an agency’s 
construction of a statute is warranted where the intent of Congress for 
that statute is unclear.61  In Chevron, respondents National Resources 
 
55 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
56 Id.  
57 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018). 
58 Goering, supra note 1, at 33. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 26.  In the recent D.C. District Court decision Grace v. Whitaker, the Court applied 
both the APA § 706(2)(A) “arbitrary and capricious” standard and the Chevron balancing test.  
It pointed out that both doctrines overlap: “Although [this] review is deferential, ‘courts retain 
a role, and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have engaged in reasoned decision 
making.’” Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 122 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Judulang v. 
Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011)). 
61 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) 
(holding that “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
9
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Defense Council, Inc., Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc., and 
North Western Ohio Lunch Association, Inc., challenged regulations 
announced by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).62  
Specifically, respondents challenged the EPA’s construction of the 
“stationary source” in the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments.63  The 
Court of Appeals held for the respondents and set the regulations 
aside.64  The Supreme Court held that the D.C. Circuit’s judgment 
resulted in error partly because it developed its own judicial definition 
of a term that lacked any congressional interpretation.65  Under the 
Chevron test, the first step is to first determine whether the statutory 
language addresses the main question at issue.66  If it does not, the court 
must determine whether Congress addressed the ambiguous provision 
in question.67  According to the APA, if the statute includes an 
undefined term, its interpretation is considered to be a question of law 
and is generally within the court’s jurisdiction to apply traditional 
statutory interpretation.68  If traditional statutory interpretation 
resolves the ambiguity, the court may apply its own interpretation, 
even if it differs from the agency’s interpretation.69  Under Chevron, if 
the statute includes an undefined term, and Congress did not address 
the ambiguity, the Court is required to determine whether Congress 
delegated the authority to the agency to provide interpretation of the 
specific provision.70  If “there is an express delegation of authority to 
the agency” to provide interpretation,71 the court will then review 
 
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute. . . . [T]he question 
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”); see also I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
62 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841 n.3. 
63 Id.  Under the 1977 amendments, industrialized states that failed to adopt the EPA’s 1970 
amended air quality standards were required to establish permit programs for new stationary 
sources.  The EPA defines “stationary sources” as “any building, structure, facility, or 
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” Id. at 846.  The 1977 amendments did 
not expressly reference “bubble concept” or contain the definition of the term “stationary 
sources.”  Id. at 851.  However, the EPA adopted an additional “plant wide” definition of 
stationary sources that allowed companies to exempt existing structures from complying with 
the permit requirement as long as the total amount of emissions did not increase.  Id. at. 854. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 842. 
66 Goering, supra note 1, at 43. 
67 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
68 Goering, supra note 1, at 43. 
69 Id. 
70 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
71 Id. at 843. 
10
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“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.”72  
The Supreme Court based its explanation on two basic 
principles.  The first is acknowledging that Congress needs 
administrative agencies to fill in the gap where there is a lack of 
expertise knowledge: “The power of administrative agencies to 
administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires 
the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, 
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”73  This “formulation of policy” 
includes technical as well as substantial knowledge.  The second 
principle is acknowledging that Congress has expressly authorized the 
agencies to create the policies: “If Congress has explicitly left a gap 
for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the 
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.  
Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they 
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”74  
C. The Circuit Split 
Applying the Chevron deference doctrine to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the PSG requirement spurred more confusion amongst 
the circuit courts.  It cannot be denied that the visible social group 
interpretation is “largely a very malleable social construct.”75  In 
Persecution of Particular Social Groups and the much Bigger 
Immigration Picture, R. George Wright stated that “[t]he circuit split 
is motivated in part by the availability of more, and less, literal families 
of interpretations of the idea of “social visibility.”76  While many courts 
have applied the Chevron test and deferred to the BIA’s interpretation 
 
72 Id. at 842-43. 
73 Id. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974)). 
74 Id. at 843-44 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to 
an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and 
the principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently followed by 
this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling 
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given 
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected 
to agency regulations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
75 R. George Wright, Persecution of Particular Social Groups and the Much Bigger 
Immigration Picture, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 163, 171-72 (2014). 
76 Id. at 170-71. 
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of the PSG requirement,77 a minority of courts refuse to defer to the 
BIA’s interpretation.   
In Scatambuli v. Holder,78 petitioners sought asylum protection 
because they feared persecution as “government informants.”79  The 
Immigration Judge and the BIA denied the claim, finding that 
government informants were not a particular social group.80  
Petitioners argued that the BIA “improperly relied on the ‘social 
visibility’” aspect of the test.81  The First Circuit denied this argument, 
and found that the petitioners failed to satisfy the PSG requirement 
because the group was not well known and thus “not particularly 
visible.”82  In Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit upheld 
the social visibility and particularity standards and found the petitioner 
failed to satisfy the requirement.83  Petitioner had claimed that she was 
persecuted on the basis of her membership in a particular social group: 
young females between the ages of 12 and 25 who resisted gang 
recruitment.84  The BIA had rejected this as satisfying the PSG 
standard, finding that the group was not “defined with particularity” or 
“socially visible” enough to constitute a particular social group.85  
Petitioner argued that the BIA’s determination was “arbitrary” and a 
limitation to the “statutory ‘particular social group’ basis for refugee 
status.”86  However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s 
determination, stating that “the particularity requirement flows quite 
naturally from the language of the statute . . . . [i]t is the BIA’s 
responsibility to give meaning to all of the language of the statute, 
especially when there is some ambiguity as to its scope and 
application.”87  In holding for the government, the Tenth Circuit 
 
77 The First and Tenth Circuits accepted the “social visibility” and “particularity” standards.  
Id. at 171; see also Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
former/current gang membership does not constitute a particular social group for the purposes 
of the asylum statute); Gonzalez v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 820 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 2016) (same). 
78 Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2009). 
79 Id. at 55. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 60.  The applicants argued that they were members of the purported group of 
“informants” who feared they would be killed if they returned to Brazil.  
83 Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 653 (10th Cir. 2012). 
84 Id. at 645.  Petitioner was harassed, assaulted, and constantly pressured to join the “Mara 
Salvatrucha” or the “MS-13” gang in El Salvador.  Gang members threatened to kill her family 
if she refused. 
85 Id. at 648. 
86 Id. at 649. 
87 Id. 
12
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expressed its support for and deference to the BIA’s interpretation of 
the PSG requirement.   
The Third and Seventh Circuit courts explicitly refused to 
apply Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the particular 
social group.  The Seventh Circuit addressed the new standards in 
Gatimi v. Holder.88  Mr. Gatimi joined a political tribe in Kenya called 
Mungiki.89  The group was known for violence, specifically they 
performed circumcision on the wives of other members.90  Gatimi 
eventually left the group.91  The group then harassed Gatimi and 
threatened to kill him if he did not give up his wife to them for 
circumcision.92  The group killed his servant and pets and burned down 
his property.93  Gatimi constantly asked the Kenyan government for 
assistance, but the government was unable to stop the group.94  Both 
he and his wife eventually fled Kenya to the United States and applied 
for asylum.95  The Seventh Circuit first noted that requiring the PSG to 
be socially visible did not make sense under circumstances of 
persecution:  
Women who have not yet undergone female genital 
mutilation in tribes that practice it do not look different 
from anyone else. A homosexual in a homophobic 
society will pass as heterosexual. If you are a member 
of a group that has been targeted for assassination or 
torture or some other mode of persecution, you will take 
pains to avoid being socially visible; and to the extent 
that the members of the target group are successful in 
remaining invisible, they will not be “seen” by other 
people in the society “as a segment of the population.”96 
 
88 Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009). 
89 Id. at 613. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 614. 
92 Id. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 613. 
95 Id. at 614. 
96 Id. at 615. 
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The court declined to apply Chevron deference to the BIA’s social 
visibility requirement because the BIA proved inconsistent in applying 
the new standard.97 
In the 2011 case Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of 
U.S., the Third Circuit addressed the new particularity and social 
visibility standards for the PSG requirement.98  Petitioner Valdiviezo-
Galdamez argued that he had been persecuted on the basis of his 
membership in a particular social group and his political opinion, and 
had a well-founded fear that this persecution would continue if he 
returned to Honduras.99  Valdiviezo-Galdamez had been kidnapped, 
beaten, and tortured by members of the MS-13 gang.100  He had called 
police for assistance but the police failed to protect him.101  Petitioner 
eventually decided to come to the United States to flee the gang.102  The 
court evaluated the new standards under the PSG requirement.103  It 
recognized that social visibility was not entitled to Chevron deference 
because it was inconsistent with the BIA’s prior decisions.104  The 
court explained that in previous decisions, the BIA recognized groups 
as “‘particular social groups’ where there was no indication that the 
group’s members possessed ‘characteristics that were highly visible 
and recognizable by others in the country in question’ or possessed 
characteristics that were otherwise ‘socially visible’ or 
recognizable.”105  The court concluded that social visibility was an 
“unreasonable addition” to the PSG requirement.106  
Further, the court rejected the government’s assertion that the 
particularity requirement was different from the social visibility 
element.107  According to the government, the particularity 
requirement was an attempt to put boundaries on the size of the PSG, 
 
97 “When an administrative agency’s decisions are inconsistent, a court cannot pick one of 
the inconsistent lines and defer to that one, unless only one is within the scope of the agency’s 
discretion to interpret the statutes it enforces or to make policy as Congress’s delegate.”  
Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616 (citing AT & T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006) and 
Idaho Power Co. v. FERC, 312 F.3d 454, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
98 Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011). 
99 Id. at 587. 
100 Id. at 586. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 587. 
103 Id. at 603. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 604. 
107 Id. at 608. 
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while social visibility helps to determine whether there is an 
identifying characteristic that confirms the group in question is set 
apart in society.108  The court noted that particularity “appear[s] to be 
different articulations of the same concept” and the government’s 
attempt to distinguish between the two concepts produced more 
confusion than clarity.109 
D. Chevron Deference Should Not Be Applicable to 
Immigration Law 
The concept of judicial deference is ill-fitted under 
immigration law.  In the Duke Law Journal article, The Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, former Justice 
Antonin Scalia provided his perspective on Chevron and the history of 
judicial deference.110  As a supporter of the Chevron test, Scalia 
admitted that it is not readily clear why a court should accept an 
executive agency’s interpretation on a question of law.111  Scalia noted 
that the Chevron test implicates traditional judicial authority outlined 
in Marbury v. Madison.112 
 However, Scalia pointed out that one of the “theoretical 
justifications” for the Chevron test was the fact that it was not meant 
to produce a genuine legislative intent, but was meant to operate 
“principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can 
legislate.”113  Scalia argued that if that justification is the real intended 
function for the test, then there is no reason to require that deference 
be consistent with agency interpretations of law.114  Without this 
requirement, it makes no sense to hold the agency to a strict standard 
of finding the one “correct” meaning of the statute.115  Instead, it is 
“free to give the statute whichever of several possible meanings it 
thinks most conducive to accomplishment of the statutory purpose.”116  
 
108 Id.  
109 Id. 
110 Scalia, supra note 1. 
111 Id. at 513.  
112 Id. 
113 Scalia believed that in most cases subject to deference “Congress neither (1) intended a 
single result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn’t think 
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According to Scalia, this flexibility should be permitted in the 
administrative process. 
Flexibility in the administrative process cannot work in the 
context of immigration law.  The BIA has shown inconsistency in the 
way it applies its own standards.  It is not justifiable to subject millions 
of refugee applicants who are seeking protection from violence to 
changing standards.  This will only result in more inconsistent holdings 
and ambiguous language.  Regarding the PSG requirement, it will be 
difficult for an applicant “to predict whether he or she will qualify as a 
refugee and obtain asylum or withholding of removal.”117  
Furthermore, the courts’ obligation to adjudicate issues arising 
under the Refugee Act of 1980 should trump the Chevron doctrine.118  
If courts continue to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of PSG, 
immigration law will become bifurcated with BIA’s interpretation on 
one side and the foundational principles of the Refugee Convention 
and the Refugee Act of 1980 on the other because the two are at odds 
with one another.  In The Board of Immigration Appeals’ New “Social 
Visibility” Test for Determining “Membership of A Particular Social 
Group” in Asylum Claims and Its Legal and Policy Implications, 
Kristin A. Bresnahan argued that courts are “surprisingly willing to 
discount international law governing domestic asylum statutes by 
deferring to expansive Executive agency statutory interpretations that 
do not conform . . . with limitations created by U.S. international treaty 
obligations.”119  Not only does Chevron pose a threat to U.S. integrity 
regarding international treaties, but it also threatens domestic 






117 Hernandez Pimentel, supra note 34. 
118 Kristin A. Bresnahan, The Board of Immigration Appeals’s New “Social Visibility” Test 
for Determining “Membership of A Particular Social Group” in Asylum Claims and Its Legal 
and Policy Implications, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 649, 663-64 (2011) (“[s]uch ‘reflexive’ 
deference is not appropriate in the context of asylum law, where Congress’s passage of the 
Refugee Act of 1980 clearly and unambiguously stated its desire to conform domestic asylum 
law to the United States’ international obligations.  As a result, congressional intent is thwarted 
when U.S. courts give Chevron deference to BIA decisions that do not conform to the 
Protocol’s provisions.”). 
119 Id. at 662. 
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V. THREAT TO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN JUDICIAL AND 
POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS 
A. Unconstitutional Bias 
The problem with Chevron deference is the potential risk of 
what Philip Hamburger calls “unconstitutional biases.”120  In Chevron 
Bias, Hamburger argued that deference allows judges to defer, and 
essentially favor, the government’s position on a specific issue.121  This 
poses a greater risk in cases where the government is a party in the 
case.122  Deference poses a constitutional risk in two ways.  First, it 
allows judges to distance themselves from the constitutionally 
mandated power of judicial review; it permits judges to abandon 
“independent judgment” for the sake of deferring to agency 
interpretation.123  Article III of the Constitution imposes on a judge the 
highest honor of interpreting the law.124  Judges are required to use 
independent judgment in reviewing the law, the basics of judicial 
review.125  However, the act of deference is “an abandonment of a 
judge’s own independent judgment” and an abandonment of the 
judiciary itself.  This act, he argues, contravenes with Article III of the 
Constitution.126 
Second, deference violates the Fifth Amendment by 
systematically favoring the government’s position on a specific 
interpretation of law and as a result, restricting due process.127  The 
problem with Chevron is that judges defer to interpretations made by 
the government agencies even if the government is a party to the 
action.  Hamburger states 
 
120 Hamburger, supra note 16, at 1211. 
121 Id. at 1212. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1209. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 1206. 
126 Id. at 1209 (“Nonetheless, in administrative cases, although judges do not defer to the 
judgments of prosecutors, of employers, or of corporations, they regularly defer to the 
judgments of executive and other administrative agencies.  The judges thereby abandon their 
very office as judges.  A judge’s central office or duty, and therefore his power and very 
identity under Article III, is to exercise his own independent judgment in cases in accord with 
the law.  He therefore cannot defer to executive or other administrative judgments about what 
the law is, but can defer only to the law.”). 
127 Id. at 1211. 
17
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under the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, 
they [judges] at the very least are barred from engaging 
in systematic bias. Nonetheless, when they defer to 
administrative interpretation, they systematically favor 
executive and other governmental interpretations over 
the interpretations of other parties. They thus 
systematically exert bias toward the government and 
against other parties, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.128 
In light of this, it is not hard to imagine the challenges these 
threats pose in the context of refugee cases presented to administrative 
judges and the BIA.  Asylum applicants already face challenges in 
facing immigration judges without representation.129  Pro se applicants 
who may not be able to afford an attorney face a new and intimidating 
legal system, unfamiliar laws, and minimal to no resources.  The idea 
that the Chevron deference doctrine affords judges the opportunity to 
implicate immigration cases with systematic biases is harrowing.  It 
only proves that the odds are stacked against refugees before they have 
their day in court.  
B. The Political Biases in Immigration Reform  
As the highest officer of law enforcement in the country, the 
U.S. Attorney General plays an important role in executing our 
immigration system based on the immigration laws enacted by 
Congress.  Some of the responsibilities of the position include 
overseeing the appointment of judges to immigration and 
administrative cases and determining how the laws should be 
interpreted.130  The Attorney General also has broad discretion in 
deciding how the government should address the issue of immigrant 
 
128 Id. at 1212. 
129 TRAC IMMIGR., ASYLUM REPRESENTATION RATES HAVE FALLEN AMID RISING DENIAL 
RATES (Nov. 28, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/491/ (demonstrating that the 
number of asylum seekers who are unable to obtain representation has risen over the last ten 
years and that statistics show that unrepresented cases are denied at a much higher rate than 
represented cases). 
130 “The Attorney General shall establish such regulations, prescribe such forms of bond, 
reports, entries, and other papers, issue such instructions, review such administrative 
determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other 
acts as the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out this section.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(g)(2) (2018). 
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detention and rights to hearings.131  It is important that the Attorney 
General remain impartial and provide a balanced perspective in his 
decisions. 
As a Republican Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration, Jeff Sessions 
often took an anti-immigration stance on many issues.132  For example, 
he was a proponent of restricting legal immigration laws or “high 
skilled immigration” in favor of American workers and American 
taxpayers.133  As senator, he also voted against the infamous “Gang of 
Eight” immigration reform deal in 2013, which proposed legislation 
that would simultaneously strengthen borders while creating a clearer 
pathway for legal immigration.134  Although the position calls for 
impartiality, it is impossible for an Attorney General to be completely 
unbiased.  The process of appointing the U.S. Attorney General is itself 
political: the president nominates and the U.S. Senate confirms the 
appointment.  In the context of immigration, it is dangerous when the 
Attorney General abuses the political process to implement personal 
biases.  
C. A Fight Against Crime or a Subtle Promotion of 
Xenophobia 
As former Attorney General, Sessions took opportunities to 
further his anti-immigration agenda.  In January 2017, President 
Trump signed an Executive Order to withdraw funding for sanctuary 
 
131 Id. 
132 Elizabeth B. Wydra, President, The Constitutional Accountability Center, Opposition 
Letter to Jefferson Sessions’ Nomination for Attorney General (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01.06.17%20CAC%20Letter%20on%20Se
ssions%20for%20AG.pdf (“[A]fter the measure passed in the Senate, Sessions published the 
‘Immigration Handbook for the New Republican Majority’ to aid House colleagues in 
defeating the House version.”). 
133 Sessions wrote an op-ed piece for the Washington Post in 2015, arguing for a “curb on 
immigration” to reduce the number of immigrants working in low wage jobs and preserve 
these jobs for U.S. workers.  Jeff Sessions, America Needs to Curb Immigration Flows, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/slow-the-immigration-
wave/2015/ 
04/09/c6d8e3d4-dd52-11e4-a500-1c5bb1d8ff6a_story.html?utm_term=.c61035744b91. 
134 Roll Call Vote 113th Congress – 1st Session, U.S. SENATE (June 11, 2013), 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113
&session=1&vote=00147 (voting on border security, economic opportunity, and the 
Immigration Modernization Act); see also Liz Halloran, Gang of 8 Champion Plan, Declare 
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cities which refused to comply with the federal crackdown on 
immigration.135  In March of 2017, Sessions announced that the 
administration would “claw-back” federal funds from sanctuary cities 
if the cities continued to “adopt policies designed to frustrate the 
enforcement of our immigration laws.”136  He justified this decision on 
the grounds that (1) that sanctuary states are violating federal law, and 
(2) that crime will increase or go unfettered without limiting sanctuary 
policies.137  
These efforts to curtail immigration laws do not constitute a 
meaningful attempt at keeping our communities’ safe.  Michael Hiltzik 
explained the misconceptions.138  First, Hiltzik argued that Sessions 
mischaracterized the role of sanctuary laws.  In the context of 
immigration law, sanctuary laws are laws that “limit government 
employees, particularly local police officers, from inquiring or 
disseminating information about the immigration status of immigrants 
whom they encounter.”139  The laws intend to foster collaboration 
between local enforcement and communities, rather than a blatant 
disregard of federal laws.140  These laws were not intended to be a 
shield to keep aliens within the cities and deny federal authority.141  
Second, Hiltzik indicated that forcing states to comply with federal law 
infringes upon separation of powers and violates the constitutionally 
protected state police powers.142  Third, Sessions overstated the 
 
135 U.S. Courts have already declared the order unconstitutional.  See City & Cty. of San 
Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th Cir. 2018). 
136 Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessio 
ns-delivers-remarks-sanctuary-jurisdictions. 
137 Id. 
138 Michael Hiltzik, Here’s What Atty. Gen. Sessions Got Wrong About the Law in His 
Attack on Sanctuary Cities, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/hilt 
zik/la-fi-hiltzik-sanctuary-sessions-20170328-story.html. 
139 Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a Sanctuary?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 148 (2008). 
140 “Localities have traditionally adopted these policies for a number of reasons, including 
the promotion of the general welfare and safety of all residents in their jurisdictions, including 
unauthorized immigrants.  Local police departments, for example, have adopted ‘non-
cooperation’ or ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policies to further public safety concerns.”  Id. 
141 “They’re not designed specifically to ‘shield aliens’ from deportation, but rather to create 
a working relationship between the police and the communities they serve.”  Hiltzik, supra 
note 138. 
142 The U.S. District Court in California concluded that the order violated the separation of 
powers and the President does not have the power to impose conditions of federal funds and, 
therefore, cannot delegate the power.  Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 531 
(N.D. Cal. 2017), reconsideration denied, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal 
dismissed as moot sub nom. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th 
20
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connection between a lack of immigration limitations and crime rates.  
A 2016 report proved that crime has fallen since the 1990s.143  Finally, 
Sessions exaggerated when he claimed that sanctuary policies violated 
Section 1373.144  The law did not require a state to gather information 
on an individual’s status.145 
On the surface, Sessions’ announcement demonstrated concern 
for the safety of American communities.  He argued that these states 
are hiding immigrants, while letting crime infest the neighborhoods, at 
the expense of the community’s safety.  However, Sessions was in 
danger of implicating the anti-commandeering principal.146  He used 
his platform to enact policies that aligned with his extreme views, 
something that he failed to do as Chairman of the Immigration 
subcommittee in the Senate.  In other words, he interjected his own 
personal bias in policy making.  In the immigration context, this 
conduct is dangerous.  The Attorney General operates as the leader of 
these agencies that regulate and enforce immigration laws.  He also 
may refer immigration decisions to himself to review.147  The Chevron 
doctrine allows courts to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the law.  
But a problem arises when the interpretation of the law is inconsistent 
with Congress’s intentions.  
 
Cir. 2018).  Hiltzik states “Defenders of states and cities point to the 10th Amendment, which 
has been widely interpreted as protecting state and local law enforcement agencies from being 
“commandeered” by the federal government to enforce federal law—such as immigration law.  
That places serious limits on the government’s ability to demand cooperation from localities 
for immigration sweeps or even detention of suspected undocumented immigrants.”  Hiltzik, 
supra note 138. 
143 Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump said ‘Crime is rising.’ It’s not (and Hasn’t Been for 
Decades), POLITIFACT (June 9, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/20 
16/jun/09/donald-trump/donald-trump-said-crime-rising-its-not-and-hasnt-b/. 
144 The law states in relevant part: “Federal, State, or local government entity or official 
may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or 
receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the 
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”  8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) 
(2018). 
145 See id.  
146 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (holding that the 
law violated the Tenth Amendment on its face: “In the end, [Section 1373] robs the local 
executive of its autonomy and ties the hands of the local legislature.  Such affronts to State 
sovereignty are not countenanced by the anticommandeering principle of the Constitution.  
Section 1373 is unconstitutional and cannot stand.”). 
147 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2018). 
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VI. THE REFERRAL PROVISION AND THE EFFECT 
A. Self-Referral Provision  
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) states in relevant part that “the Board 
shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision all cases 
that (i) the Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him; (ii) [t]he 
Chairman or a majority of the Board believes should be referred to the 
Attorney General for review.”148  This authority was first established 
in regulations issued in 1940149 and has since gone through 
amendments.150  Only three actors can use the self-referral: The 
Attorney General, the BIA, and the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security.151  There is no regulations in place to guide the 
Attorney General on how to refer the case to himself or herself or how 
to review the case.152  Also, notice of self-referral is not required to be 
provided to the litigants.153  The Attorney General reviews the case on 
a de novo standard.154  The Attorney General’s decision is given 
precedential treatment and is binding on government and parties to the 
action.  
The lack of procedural limitations on the authority poses a 
threat to an applicant’s right to due process.  In Disruptive Immigration 
Power, Professor Bijal Shah evaluated the self-referral provision and 
the consequences of its use.155  She argued that the lack of procedural 
limits to the referral power allows the Attorney General to prioritize 
the agency’s interests such as reaffirming the agency’s role in 
immigration policy making and the government’s defense in 
immigration litigation.156  These interests favor the government’s 
position at the expense of the noncitizen litigant.157  
 
148 Id. 
149 Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glenn, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration 
Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 850 (2016) 
(citing to 8 C.F.R. § 90.12 (1940)). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 852. 
152 Id. at 853. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 856. 
155 Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
129 (2017). 
156 Id. at 135. 
157 Id. at 136 (“And yet, to the extent aims furthering the agency’s immigration interests are 
achieved and maintained at the expense procedural transparency, due process, and of 
22
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Furthermore, the self-referral mechanism is disruptive.158  
When the Attorney General self-refers, the action is automatically 
stayed pending the review.159  Shah describes this as an interruption of 
“the organic development of immigration law by the federal courts”160 
and an alteration of longstanding doctrine.161  The self-referral 
mechanism permits the Attorney General to review foundational 
decisions and overturn longstanding interpretation.162  Sessions’ 
decision in the Matter of A-B- portrays the disruptive use of the self-
referral mechanism.  
B. The Matter of A-R-C-G- & Matter of A-B-  
On June 11, 2018, Sessions vacated Matter of A-B- and 
expressly overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-.163  In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the 
BIA held that married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave 
their relationship is a particular social group within the meaning of the 
asylum statute.164  Although Guatemala has laws to prevent domestic 
violence, enforcement of those law was “problematic.”165  It was clear 
that the government refused to assist respondent; she appealed to the 
local police multiple times for protection, and the police refused to 
assist her.166  Further, the BIA found evidence supporting the assertion 
 
independent decision-making, exercise of the referral and review power runs counter to 
administrative decision-making norms and may even be unconstitutional.”). 
158 Id. at 144. 
159 Gonzales & Glenn, supra note 149, at 853. 
160 Shah, supra note 155, at 144. 
161 Id. (“In one example, the Attorney General effectively altered longstanding judicial 
doctrine by adopting a minority court’s view.  Here, most courts . . . had upheld the BIA’s 
decision in Matter of C-Y-Z-, which established that forced sterilization of one spouse is an act 
of persecution against the other spouse.  The Second Circuit reversed the BIA by holding that 
the statute in question did not provide for per se refugee status for the spouses of those who 
had undergone involuntary or forced sterilizations and abortions.  After the Second Circuit 
issued its decision, the Attorney General overruled the BIA in a subsequent case in order to 
reaffirm the federal court’s opinion.”). 
162 Id. at 146 (“In one circumstance, the BIA twice reversed the immigration judge[’s] 
denial of asylum on the grounds that the immigration judge did not meet the standard set out 
in statute to prohibit status on the basis of national security.  The Attorney General then 
reversed the BIA’s decision by creating and applying a new standard that diverged from statute 
in order to increase the national security barrier to asylum.  Some, but not all federal circuits, 
including the Second, Third and Ninth Circuits, have questioned or declined to defer to the 
Attorney General’s new standard.”). 
163 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018). 
164 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390 (B.I.A. 2014). 
165 Id. at 394. 
166 Id. at 389. 
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that married women were subject to sexual offenses such as spousal 
rape in Guatemala.167  
On March 7, 2018, Jeff Sessions moved to refer to himself the 
case Matter of A-B- for review.168  The 2016 BIA case dealt with an El 
Salvadorian woman fleeing domestic abuse and found that the women 
successfully established the PSG standard, based on the test developed 
in Matter of A-R-C-G-.169  Sessions requested parties to submit briefs 
answering the issue on “whether being a victim of private criminal 
activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes 
of an application for asylum or withholding of removal.”170  
According to Sessions, the BIA failed to apply the correct 
applicable law in Matter of A-R-C-G-.171  Specifically, he argued that 
[S]uch applicants must establish membership in a 
particular and socially distinct group that exists 
independently of the alleged underlying harm, 
demonstrate that their persecutors harmed them on 
account of their membership in that group rather than 
for personal reasons, and establish that the government 
protection from such harm . . . is so lacking that their 
persecutors’ actions can be attributed to the 
government.172 
He was critical of the BIA’s decision to accept stipulations from the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) confirming respondent as 
a member of a particular social group.173  Sessions examined the 
particular social group standard and held that groups “defined by their 
vulnerability to private criminal activity” do not constitute a particular 
social group.  For these reasons, he concluded, claims for domestic 
violence or gang violence would not qualify for asylum.174   
 
167 Id. 
168 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317. 
169 The decision was unpublished, but counsel released a redacted copy of the court’s 
decision.  Daniel M. Kowalski, Due Process, Asylum Protections for Women Under Attack: 
Matter of A-B- Revealed, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/immigration-law-blog/posts/due-
process-asylum-protections-for-women-under-attack-matter-of-a-b-revealed.  
170 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 331. 
174 Id. at 335; see also Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 108-09 (D.D.C. 2018). 
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Next, Sessions discussed the persecution requirement.175  He 
explained that the persecution must include (1) an intent to target a 
belief or characteristic, (2) severe harm, and (3) suffering inflicted by 
the government or by persons the government was unable or unwilling 
to control.176  A petitioner who suffers from a private actor, he 
explained, must show that “the government condoned the private 
actions ‘or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the 
victims.’”177 
Finally, Sessions discussed the nexus requirement between the 
harm inflicted and membership in a particular social group.178  He 
explained that where a private actor inflicts violence, being a member 
of the social group may not be the “central” reason for the harm.179  
According to Sessions, in A-R-C-G-, there was no evidence that 
petitioner was attacked because her husband was hostile to her being a 
married woman in Guatemala who is unable to leave the 
relationship.180 
Sessions’ opinion is an example of why judicial deference may 
be ill-fitted under the immigration context: deferring to an opinion 
such as Matter of A-B-, which only fueled more confusion and put 
political and social biases on center stage, harms applicants who may 
not know how to satisfy the changing standards.181  In the case where 
an applicant is establishing past persecution to prove fear of future 
persecution, the petitioner’s alleged social group will inevitably be 
defined by the persecution itself.182 
VII. DUE PROCESS AS AN IRREVOCABLE RIGHT 
Having evaluated the ways in which judicial deference and the 
self-referral mechanism can threaten basic constitutional rights for 
noncitizen applicants and risk undoing basic constitutional values in 
 
175 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 338. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Courts have held that an applicant is required to only prove fear of future persecution.  
In order to do so, the applicant must establish past persecution on account of a protected 
ground.  However, Sessions compiled the requirements for proving future persecution under 
the general umbrella of “persecution.”  NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., supra note 50. 
182 Id.  
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the name of favoritism and bias, the author in this Part evaluates ways 
in which these doctrines can be used to avoid infringing on a refugee’s 
right to due process. 
A. Chevron Deference Deserves More Scrutiny from 
The Courts 
Under immigration law, the application of Chevron deference 
should be consistent with the principles of due process under the U.S. 
Constitution.  One solution would be to cease deference in immigration 
cases.  The Chevron doctrine allows courts to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of law, essentially abandoning their own constitutionally 
mandated authority to review and interpret the law.  In extinguishing 
the Chevron doctrine, the rulemaking authority of agencies would be 
more defined and less indirect.183  
Another solution would be for courts to actually consider the 
constitutional ramifications of applying Chevron deference.  Courts 
should consider whether deference would result in substantial 
deprivation of due process in litigation.  Perhaps there should be 
additional standards applied on a case by case basis to determine 
whether the case merits Chevron deference: where a case involves the 
government, the court should look to see if the agency has a record of 
being unbiased and direct in its application of the law for that specific 
issue.  In the context of immigration law, judges should not only look 
to see if the BIA’s interpretation of the law is consistent with 
presumable congressional intent, but should also look to see if the BIA 
has applied the law consistently, without bias.  This may ensure that 
judges do not blindly defer to an agency’s interpretation, but instead 
take extra care in making sure that the foundational principle of due 
process is upheld.  An example of this is the recent District Court 
decision Grace v. Whitaker, in which the court expressly overruled 





183 Hamburger, supra note 16, at 1240 (“Many agencies would therefore eventually seek an 
expansion of express and specific congressional authorization of rulemaking, and Congress 
would probable oblige them.  In place of relying on ambiguity to convey power to agencies, 
Congress would increase its express and specific statutory authorization, including substantial 
statutory detail and clarity about the parameters of the agencies’ rulemaking authority.”). 
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B. Grace v. Whitaker & The Power of Judicial Review 
Under APA & Chevron Deference. 
In Grace v. Whitaker, asylum applicants brought an action 
against the Attorney General arguing that the new credible fear policies 
outlined in Matter of A-B- violated the APA and INA.184  The plaintiffs 
in the action were twelve adults and children.185  Each plaintiff was 
fleeing gang and/or domestic violence from Central America and 
seeking asylum in the United States.186  Each applicant was found to 
have credible fear of persecution pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).187  However, asylum officers determined that 
pursuant to the standards in Matter of A-B-, plaintiffs’ claims resulted 
in negative credible fear determinations.188 
The court applied both the “arbitrary and capricious” standard 
under the APA and Chevron deference doctrine,189 and held that the 
credible fear policies in Matter of A-B- violated immigration laws.190  
The court reviewed the PSG and persecution standards set forth in 
Matter of A-B-.191  Under step one of the Chevron test, the court 
determined that the phrase “particular social group” was ambiguous 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 because Congress did not attach any specific 
meaning to it in the Refugee Act of 1980.192  The Court acknowledged 
that although the INA does not define “particular social group,”193 
Congress intended that the Refugee Act conform to the Protocol of 
 
184 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 122 (D.D.C. 2018).  In laying out the legal 
foundation, the Court first outlined the asylum regulations: before determining whether an 
applicant is a refugee as defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), the applicant must be 
subjected to an expedited removal procedure in which petitioners are given a summary 
removal process instead of a full hearing before an immigration judge.  However, under 8 
U.S.C. § §1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), “if an alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . 
or a fear of persecution” the alien must be referred for an interview with a U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services asylum officer.  The standard for determining whether the alien has 
credible fear is a “low screening standard.”  If the officer finds that credible fear exists, the 
alien is taken out of the expedited removal process and afforded a standard removal hearing 
before the immigration judge.  Id. at 106-07. 
185 Id. at 111. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 112. 
189 Id. at 120-122. 
190 Id. at 105. 
191 Id. at 122. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 123. 
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1967.194  The court explained that since Congress accepted the 
definition of “refugee,” it accepted the definition of “particular social 
group” under the Protocol.195  As a result, “particular social group” at 
the time of the act “normally comprises persons of similar background, 
habits, or social status.”196   
In addition, the court held that Congress had not spoken 
directly to the issue of whether gangs and domestic-related violence 
satisfies the PSG requirement.197  The court concluded that this issue, 
along with the term “particular social group,” was ambiguous under 
the first step of Chevron test.198  This allowed the court to proceed to 
“step two” of the Chevron test to determine whether Sessions’ 
interpretation of the PSG standard was “arbitrary and capricious.”199  
Sessions’ decision and attempt to exclude gang and domestic related 
violence from credible fear determinations were not “adequately 
explained nor supported by agency precedent.”200  The court held that 
the “general rule against domestic violence and gang-related claims 
during credible fear determination is arbitrary and capricious and 
violates the immigrations laws.”201  Finally, after going through the 
Chevron analysis, the court found that Sessions was not authorized to 
recreate a new persecution definition because the term was not 
historically an ambiguous term under the statute.202 
Whitaker exemplifies how courts should utilize both the APA’s 
authorization for judicial review of agency actions and the Chevron 
doctrine.  The doctrine should not be a mechanism where judicial 
courts blindly defer to an agency’s interpretation of statutes.  It is true 
that the Chevron doctrine is a necessary tool for courts to utilize an 
agency’s technical knowledge in specialized area of law.  But this does 
not mean courts are completely absolved from applying judicial review 
of agency actions.  This Note does not argue that the BIA should 
 
194 Id. at 124. 
195 Id. 
196 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) handbook defines the 
terms under the Protocol.  The court explained “The UNHCR Handbook states that ‘a 
“particular social group” normally comprises persons of similar background, habits, or social 
status.’” Id. (citing UNHCR Handbook at Ch. II B(3)(e) ¶ 77). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 125. 
200 Id. at 127. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 130. 
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become obsolete in its role.  Nor should the judicial courts review all 
immigration cases.  The goal of this article is to analyze the dangers of 
masquerading personal biases as precedential law and the effects this 
has under the current U.S. immigration system.  Courts must apply 
judicial scrutiny to review agency interpretations of statutes and serve 
as a check on administrative adjudicators. 
C. The Self-Referral Mechanism Needs Procedural 
Limits 
In Disruptive Immigration Power, Professor Bijal Shah 
introduces various ways in which the Attorney General may use the 
referral mechanism to not infringe on one’s rights to due process.203  
One way is to provide more procedural limitation to ensure due process 
is given to applicants in litigation.  In moving to self-refer a case, the 
Attorney General should be required to provide actual notice to the 
litigants detailing her intentions on the case and the guidelines in 
providing briefs to support opposing positions.  In doing so, counsel 
will not be blindsided by the Attorney General’s decision.  Further, 
there should be time limits for the Attorney General to exercise the 
self-referral provision.  The Attorney General should not be allowed to 
overturn precedent that resulted in years of rulings, reverting the status 
of many refugees and ultimately causing more disruption than clarity. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Permitting courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of 
important immigration laws causes confusion and distances U.S. 
immigration law from its initial purposes.  U.S. Circuit courts 
providing deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the PSG 
requirement has resulted in confusion and division amongst 
adjudicators and jurisdictions.  Further, Jeff Sessions’ work as a 
senator, and later as U.S. Attorney General, exacerbated his 
divisiveness, resulting in his overturning decades worth of 
 
203 Shah, supra note 155, at 139 (“One targeted solution would be to prioritize rule of law 
values by creating uniform procedural requirements for the exercise of the referral and review 
tool.  More specifically, these norms could be furthered by implementing standardized 
procedural requirements (such as notice, a briefing schedule, a consistent role for noncitizens’ 
counsel, etc.) for the Attorney General’s exercise of the referral and review mechanism. . . . 
[S]uch measures would be more effective if concretized by legislation or regulations, and thus 
not subject to discretionary alteration by the Attorney General.”). 
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immigration precedents via an often-unused procedural mechanism: a 
self-serving decision rooted in political bias and improper 
generalizations about immigrants from Central America.  As such, the 
self-referral provision should be amended to prevent abuse of the 
provision by the Attorney General. 
The Chevron doctrine and self-referral mechanism contravene 
constitutional principles.  They hurt asylum applicants by injecting 
political biases into the immigration process and allow adjudicators to 
discard their duties to interpret the law and apply independent 
judgment.  It is important to have an efficient immigration system.  
However, this should not come at the expense of the rights to due 
process for those whose primary goal is to seek a better life and second 
chance in the United States.  
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